[E]ven the most impressive evidence from mediumistic messages would not, by itself, constitute sufficiently strong evidence for life after death. If that were all we had to go on, even in combination with a philosophical worldview that allows for the possibility of life after death, we should probably conclude that, as complex as the superpsi hypothesis must become to account for all the evidence, it is to be preferred to the survivalist hypothesis. Additional credibility may be lent to the evidence from mediumistic evidence, however, by the other types of direct evidence for life after death.

They are not strong evidence. "[W]e cannot, even in the best of cases . . . rule out the likelihood that the motivation for the 'possession,'therefore the initiative behind it, lies in the present subject [the currently earthly living person]. And, insofar as the initiative is deemed to be in the present subject, the nonsurvivalist hypothesis of retroprehensive [see end of answer] inclusion is supported." Seeming memories of heavenly life "could be simply interpreted as fantasies unconsciously created . . . to fill out the account in a way that would meet the Spiritualist expectations" of investigators. "Whether this theory can remain plausible when the subject is a young child will be the central question of the next chapter."

The [University of Virginia Medical School professor] investigator of seemingly reincarnation cases, "who has since 1966 published over sixty extensive, meticulously documented studies of what he calls 'cases of the reincarnation type,' and numerous other less completely documented cases."

"The theory of retroprehensive inclusion, as apparently the strongest superpsi alternative to literal reincarnation, can quite easily handle the first three objections. It can also perhaps handle the fourth, fifth, and sixth objections, even if the explanations must become rather convoluted. The eighth and ninth objections, however, seem to be insuperable [see below re 8 & 9] (even though more data are needed before any definitive judgment can be made). Whether the nonsurvivalist interpretation is further undermined by the seventh objection—the fact that out-of-body experiences, which it implies should not occur [I assume only if reincarnation were to be immediate], are widely reported—will be examined in Chapter 8."

[THE OBJECTIONS to retroprehensive inclusion:]

5. (p. 198) "if nothing else does, at least announcing dreams and congenital deformities point to the initiative of the prior soul.

6. (p. 202)

7. (p. 204) "It predicts not only that there would be no discarnate experiences between lives, but that there would be no discarnate experiences whatever. Any evidence for out-of-body experiences of any sort, accordingly, would threaten the superpsi alternative and give support to the survivalist interpretation of cases of the reincarnation type." See Ch. 8.

8. (pp. 204-206) Retroprehensive inclusion would allow multiple "reincarnations" of the same being, but the evidence does not support this.

9. (pp. 206-207) "the absence of strong and abundant evidence for premortem reincarnations counts strongly against the theory of retroprehensive inclusion as a general theory for cases of the reincarnation type: If it were the correct theory, such 'reincarnations' of still-living personalities should be quite common. The fact that all the good evidence for reincarnation involves souls whose bodies have died suggests rather convincingly that bodily death brings about a change that makes it possible for a soul to become reincarnated. [He seems to attribute little native power to a soul, which always has the active involvement of God in its experiences.] And this lends support to some theory of literal reincarnation, according to which the soul continues to have experiences after separation from the physical-biological body, over against all superpsi theories, including that of retroprehensive inclusion.

"[1] One point involves timing: On the one hand, most apparitions of the dead or dying occur within an hour of the death of the apparent [the person who appears to a living person, as defined at p. 209] . . . On the other hand, apparitions of the living . . . occur most often when the apparent is thinking or dreaming about the place in question and perhaps even trying to be there, or at least to be perceived there.

[2] A second point of comparison involves the appearance and behavior of apparitions: In the . . . Hornell Hart [comparing] apparitions of the dead and dying with reciprocal apparitions [p. 225, meaning that the two persons involved are aware of each other] concluded that they were 'so closely similar . . . that the two types must be regarded as belonging to the same basic kind of phenomena."

This leads to the conclusion "that in at least some apparitions of the dead the apparitions are produced, at least partly, by the intentional activity and/or presence of the still-conscious minds of the apparents."

"[W]hat are, from without, 'apparitions' are sometimes, from within, 'out-of-body experiences.'" The next chapter deals with evidence about it.

On the other hand, if they do employ the notion of superpsi in order to provide a nonsurvivalist interpretation of all this evidence, they will in effect have accepted a view of mind as distinct from the brain and as having power both to perceive and to act without the brain's mediation. They will thereby have rejected the modern reasons for assuming that the mind is not the kind of reality that could survive bodily death. Once this antecedent improbability of survival is rejected, there is no reason why a superpsi explanation of the data should be considered antecedently preferable to a survivalist interpretation. . . .

[Of the five kinds of evidence considered, only the possession type didn't contain phenomena "strongly suggestive of survival."

The theism according to which "God has the power to interrupt the normal causal processes of the world," specifically in "miracles."

"I have no need of that hypothesis."

"God is not a scientific hypothesis."

causal nexus."

It is destructive as well as creative, coercive as well as persuasive.

(1) believing the right dogmas, (2) praying in a perfunctory way, and (3) avoiding a limited number of types of action, especially sexual.

"a spiritual adventure through which our souls continuously increase in wisdom, compassion, loving kindness, joy, beauty, peacefulness."

Scriptures of all religious traditions: "mixtures of divine inspiration and human ignorance."

People in other religions: "fellow travelers, from whom one can learn and with whom one can share."

Calamities of life: since "divine power is not the power to prevent and to destroy [calamities] would not be viewed as punishments or trials inflicted by God, not even as events God 'permitted' while having power to prevent."

Holy Power of the universe: "wholly good, wholly supportive of everything fine."

Divine vengeance: "self-contradictory."

The religious life: ""based entirely on attraction toward the true, the good, and the beautiful, not partly on fear of punishment."

(1, p. 272) the reality of the self-determining soul, (2, p. 273) the power of the soul, (3, p. 273) the reality of God, (4, p. 276) the power of God, (5, p. 283) our experience of God and values), and (6, p. 287) our continuing journey [after bodily death].

"the existence of a mind or soul, in the sense of a center of experience that is not simply the brain or an impotent by-product thereof."

They can include or exclude, as in Ch. 3, parapsychological evidence.]

its self-discipline, i.e., "its power [1] to determine its own states," and not only [2] "its power to influence its motor-muscular system through its brain," but [3] to influence its own and other bodies, sometimes dramatically (as in psychosomatic healing and stigmata), either unconsciously (as in poltergeist phenomena) or consciously, [4] either to promote growth, which is to bless (positively) or to curse (negatively).

The "twofold presupposition . . . that [1] there are values in terms of which the soul should be disciplined and that [2] the soul has access to these values." "[T]he capacity for nonsensory perception, which parapsychology supports, provides a necessary presupposition of access to such values . . .

"a [the] subject of cosmic scope."

PANENTHEISM

"God is the soul of the universe. God relates to the world in somewhat the same way we are related to our bodies. God is thereby the dominant member of the universal society, providing the overall order, and the supreme recipient of value, feeling both the delights and the pains of the creatures." See the Hartshorne quotation after question 74.

No.

"the mechanistic view of nature"

How could a Cosmic Mind exert causal influence on insentient matter, matter that can conceivably be moved only by the impact of other bits of matter?"

It does this by giving additional support to a panexperientialist view of the universe. Mind-mind and mind-matter relations are essentially the same. "What we know from within as "mind" and what we know from without as "matter" are not . . . different in kind." ESP and PK effects on "inanimate matter" suggest this.

"the occurrence of 'the miraculous.'" In medieval times God was considered the primary cause of every happening, and miracles were happenings in which there were no secondary, natural causes.

Taking an all-or-nothing approach, with regard to (1) the human soul, attempting to show its immortal nature a priori by defining it as absolutely different in kind from the rest of nature; to (2) God, by insisting on God's absolute omnipotence over the universe; to (3) paranormal phenomena in Biblical and current times as impossible except by divine intervention.

Denial of real contact with objectively existing moral and aesthetic values, hence widespread moral and aesthetic relativism, so there is no distinction of higher and lower values, and nihilism.

We can't change the past, but we can "finally . . . realize that our religious, moral, and aesthetic knowledge, like our scientific knowledge, is based on direct [nonsensory, intuitive] perception."

"of infinite intrinsic [as distinguished from instrumental] worth" and therefore that what is Holy "is the reality in relation to which it is appropriate to order one's life."

"They represent merely an extreme form of experience that is being enjoyed all the time," including direct prehensions of other human minds.

"primarily as a person on a spiritual journey."

Loss of belief in life after death makes the journey one with an end rather soon.

(1) Any such existence of the soul after death would be timeless. The first basis for this is that God is timeless, but this is rejected by panentheism. A second basis is that "time is the result of physical processes," including entropy, from which we would be free after death. Rather, settled past, present, and still-to-be-settled future are functions of experience. So life after death would be temporal, however different time may be in the afterlife. A third basis is precognitive experiences, interpreted as timeless; however, to the extent that precognition may be coherent it is not timeless.

(2) Fearful thinking that life after death is either undesirable or harmful: aesthetically unattractive, boring, or frightening, or morally repellent (either because people are motivated simply by wanting to go to heaven or that people are condemned to endless torment, through no fault of their own. In answer, life after death may not be as pictured and it needn't imply immortality. (3-5 may be subdivisions of 2.)

(3) An objection to belief in life after death is that it has been taught by dubious organizations, such as a church with "keys to the kingdom" and televangelists who point to the only way to heaven. But such connections are irrelevant.

(4) Life after death has been used as an opiate, undermining passion to achieve justice here and now. There is no necessary connection between LAD and conceptions of rewards and punishments, and even reincarnation needn't be tied to karma.

(1) Overcome inordinate fear of death characteristic of the modern world.

(2) Give courage to fight for freedom, social justice, and ecologically sustainable policies. We are not subject to any earthly power.

(3) Develop greater love for a universe in which unfairness of present life is not the final word.

(4) Overcome materialistic (in a popular sense) view of life.

(5) Overcome political "realism" viewing people as selfish.

Among these are (1) the reality of conscious experience (which eliminative materialism denies), (2) reality of a world beyond ourselves (not necessarily a material one), (3) the reality of (efficient) causation as real influence (as distinguished from Hume's understanding of causality as merely regularity of sequence, constant conjunction), (4) the causal efficacy (power) of our bodies for conscious experience, (5) freedom in the sense of partial self-determination in the moment, (6) the efficacy of conscious experience for (on) bodily behavior (mind over matter), (7) the reality and efficacy of values (final causation, as distinguished from the efficient causation that is the power of the past).

Objective values, such as Platonic forms, "can exist only as entertained by something actual, by a mind, . . . a cosmic subject, [that has them as] appetitions.

"[T]he fundamental religious desire is the desire to be in harmony with the supreme power of the universe. It is hard to see the trinity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, for all its grandeur, as the supreme power of the universe. . . . The supreme power can only be that which is responsible for the fine-tuned order of the physical constants of the universe, for the emergence of life, and for the human form of life. . . . We need an actual, not merely an ideal or 'as-if,' God."

inferior beings"

It "has made the idea of causal influence from God in the evolutionary process seem completely out of place."

"Understanding our own souls in terms of their psychokinetic potential, thereby moving away from [full or near] epiphenomenalism . . . we have an analogical basis for seeing the supreme power of the universe as a Universal Soul through whose downward causal influence the various levels of order in our universe, from atoms to human, have been built up."

"By helping undermine the idea of divine omnipotence" (since paranormal experiences keep doing the seemingly divine).

"the two dimensions implied in our idea of a Holy Reality: perfect in goodness as well as supreme in power [but not literally omnipotent]."

"It might be . . . that we would continue to exist only as long as we still had unfulfilled desires."

Materialism "is simply a decapitated version of [dualism], having retained [dualism's] 'nature' while lopping off its 'mind.'"

2. "Inadequacy to the Unity of Our Bodily Behavior." "If there is 'no single Boss,' but merely a vast aggregation of microagents, how is this coordination [such as driving while talking, smiling, etc.] achieved?

3. "Difficulty Acknowledging the Efficacy of Consciousness for Bodily Behavior." "The issue here is epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that consciousness is merely a nonefficacious by-product of the brain. . . . But the denial that our conscious experience affects our bodily behavior seems to conflict with out hard-core common sense."

4. "Inadequacy to Freedom. The hard-core commonsense presupposition most consistently denied by materialists is the partial freedom of conscious experience, along with the consequent partial freedom of our bodily behavior (which follows from the efficacy of consciousness for our bodily behavior."

5. "Inadequacy to Values." The doctrine "that nothing but material things exist . . . rules out not only a (nonmaterial) mind but also those things often called 'values,' such as truth , beauty, and goodness. . . . Materialism's reductionistic account of values inevitably creates an opposition between theory and practice."

7. "The meaning of Mind-Brain Identity." Materialists assume "that the 'gray matter' of the brain is also 'matter' in the philosophical sense—namely, that it is devoid of all experience." How can our experience be identical with a large collection of nonexperiencing things. Even materialists are coming to admit that this makes no sense.

[Related summary, p. 127: "The main argument for materialism has always been that, whatever its problems, it is not as bad as dualism, with its insuperable problems. The main argument for dualism has always been that, whatever its problems, they are at least not as severe as those of materialism. . . . John Searle puts the point [about materialism] even more strongly, seeing the 'deepest motivation of materialism' to be 'simply a terror of consciousness.'"]

Monism (of the qualitative kind) is the position "that there is only one kind of reality." Materialistic monism, holding that there is only matter, "is really dualism in disguise," since materialist believe that there are also observing experiencers.

1. "The Problem of Discontinuity." The empirical dimension of this problem: The principle of continuity that maintains that there should be no absolute jumps in the evolutionary process, and we increasingly find by empirical enquiry such continuity, but the dualistic view, more than the materialistic, "posits an absolute difference in kind between entities that experience and those that do not. The former have an 'inside' and exercise final causation, whereas purely material entities are all 'outside' and operate entirely by efficient causation."

2. "The Problem of Where to Draw the Line . . . between mental and physical things." "Are we to say that bacteria are alive, and therefore sentient, while viruses, which have some but not all the properties usually said to characterize living things, or not? Or, if we include viruses, are we going to exclude macromolecules, such as DNA, RNA, and protein molecules, in spite of their remarkable abilities? . . . Wherever dualism draws its line between experiencing and nonexperiencing entities will be arbitrary. This problem, however, cannot comfort materialists. Because of their cryptodualism, it equally applies to them."

3. "How Could There Have Been Time for Experience to Emerge?" "[T]ime presupposes experience, because without experience there would be no 'now,' therefore no distinction between past and future. Dualists, accordingly, must hold that time itself arose sometime in the course of the evolutionary process. . . . [Yet] evolution itself presupposes the existence of time."

It is a view (of Griffin and other Whiteheadian philosophers) that accepts the numerical difference of mind and brain, while denying the ontological difference, so interaction is possible. Griffin says that henceforth we should use the term "dualism" only to refer to Cartesian dualism, "or some variant thereof, according to which mind and matter are said to be ontologically different in kind. In other words, 'dualism' should be used only as shorthand for 'ontological dualism.'" We should "distinguish between two types of interactionism: dualistic interactionism and non-dualistic interactionism." In other words, nondualistic interactionism is what is referred to in Anderson, p. 6, as "relative dualism," while Cartesian dualism there is called "absolute dualism."

"[W]hen the body dies, so does the soul." Based on some Renaissance philosophies "according to which all matter has the power of self-motion . . . the fact that the soul is a self-moving thing, as Plato said, does not prove that the soul is incorruptible, because matter is self-moving and yet the body clearly decays."

1. There is no line between the sentient and insentient. "[N]ature as portrayed by modern science not only does not suggest a clear place to draw a line between sentient and insentient things, but also suggests, with its evolutionary continuities, the probability that no such place exists. This suggestion, that experience and spontaneity may go all the way down, has been increasingly supported as the scientific study of nature has become increasingly subtle."

2. "The 'pan' in panexperientialism" refers only to individuals. See question 73.

The materialist requires belief (a) that there are individuals not analogous to us and (b) that there are nonexperiencing individuals; whereas panexperientialism requires only belief that all individuals are like what we experience ourselves to be, experiencing.

4. "[T]he panexperientialist starting point is pragmatic: It works. That is, by beginning with the working hypothesis that at least some iota of spontaneous experience characterizes individuals at every level of nature, we can affirm nondualistic interactionism, in which all the ontological problems of dualistic interactionism are avoided: Interaction between mind and brain is no longer counterintuitive, because the mind and the brain cells are said to be qualitatively similar, only greatly different in degree. There is no absolute line in the evolutionary process between sentience and insentience. There is no problem of emergence, because conscious experience is said to emerge not out of insentient matter but out of things with less sophisticated experience. . . .

problems that have plagued dualism and materialism." Our prehension is "perception in the mode of causal efficacy." "The 'intuition' of values, such as truth, beauty, and goodness, also occurs through this nonsensory mode of perception. Likewise, our knowledge of the past arises from the fact that our present moment of experience directly prehends our own past moments of experience, this being the form of nonsensory prehension that we call 'memory' [involving] more or less creative reconstructions as well as prehensions of the past events as they really happened."