Scholars have paid considerable attention to the development of certain aspects of Whitehead's philosophy. The most notable example is Lewis Ford, who traces in detail the way in which Whitehead’s thought developed during his construction of the texts of Science and the Modern World, Religion in the Making, and Process and Reality.(1) Subsequently, Jorge Luis Nobo has contended that Whitehead makes significant changes in his metaphysical views between Process and Reality and Adventures of Ideas.(2) There have also been more limited studies of the development of certain key concepts in Whitehead's philosophy, such as the concept of God or the concept of creativity. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the issue of whether development takes place in Whitehead's thought about goodness. The present paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. The concepts of goodness and value are surely important to Whitehead's philosophy; this is nicely expressed by Donald Sherburne when he says "the universe in its very essence...is a striving after harmony, after Beauty, after value."(3) The centrality of questions of goodness and value for Whitehead make it all the more important for us to ascertain whether his thought about these topics undergoes significant development.(4)

The claim I wish to make and defend is that Whitehead's thought about goodness undergoes development from Process and Reality to Adventures of Ideas. Althought this development is subtle, it has important consequences because the development constitutes (or so I will argue) an advance in Whitehead's thinking. In Process and Reality, Whitehead holds that the highest good is "intensity of feeling" or "intensity of experience." However, in Adventures of Ideas it seems that "Beauty" becomes his highest good. This claim is different in important respects from Whitehead's claim in Process and Reality. Whereas Beauty has an affinity with intensity of experience, the two concepts cannot be strictly identified. Furthermore, I will argue that Beauty is richer than intensity of experience; it permits Whitehead to embrace a view of goodness that is more comprehensive and more dynamic. My project will be to trace this development and then to show how Whitehead's view of goodness in Adventures of Ideas is superior to the view in Process and Reality.

I. Our first task is to look at Process and Reality and examine the evidence for our claim that Whitehead takes "intensity of experience" to be his highest good there. Part of this evidence depends upon Whitehead’s implicit acceptance of what I will term "Aristotle's principle." According to Aristotle's principle, the highest good is that at which all things aim (Nicomachean Ethics 1094a1-5). Here I conceive of the highest good in metaphysical terms (as Whitehead himself did) and not just in relation to human life. Whitehead calls his basic units of reality “actual entities,” and he claims that each actual entity enjoys a rudimentary form of experience. The “subjective aim” of an actual entity is an aim at the best possible form of value which the actual entity can realize in its experience (see PR 244). It is an aim at what is best given the limitations imposed by the circumstances from which the actual entity arises. I think Whitehead implicitly accepts Aristotle's claim that that at which all things aim must be the highest good. Moreover, the goal of an actual entity can be discovered by examining its subjective aim. Thus, we must see whether the subjective aims of all actual entities are directed toward a common goal. If so, we can conclude that this must be Whitehead’s highest good.

There is evidence from Whitehead’s Categoreal Scheme that the subjective aim of every actual entity is at a common goal and that this goal is "intensity of feeling." This evidence appears in the eighth Categoreal Obligation, which Whitehead calls the "Category of Subjective Intensity":

The subjective aim [of an actual entity], whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (b) in the relevant future. (PR 27, italics in text).

Whitehead's elucidatory comments on this passage make it clear that the subjective aim of an actual entity is primarily at its own intensity of feeling, or what he calls intensity of feeling “in the immediate subject.” But in aiming for intensity of feeling in its immediate experience, the actual entity must also aim at intensity of feeling in the relevant future. This is because each actual entity has anticipatory feelings of its effect upon future actual entities, and these anticipatory feelings affect the intensity of its immediate experience. Thus, an actual entity must aim at intensity of feeling in its relevant future in order to enhance the intensity of its present experience. This concern for the future directly affects the intensity of experience it enjoys right now.

Whitehead also holds that God's subjective aim is at intensity of experience. After Whitehead has distinguished the three natures of God, he sums up his view of God and describes the nature of God's subjective aim:

This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the goad toward novelty. 'Order' and 'Novelty' are but the instruments of his subjective aim which is the intensification of 'formal immediacy.' (PR 88)

The "formal immediacy" of an actual entity is the type of existence an actual entity enjoys when it is coming into being as the subject of its own experiences (see PR 25-6). A term Whitehead uses as a synonym for "formal immediacy" is "subjective immediacy." Thus, to say that God's subjective aim is at the intensification of “formal immediacy” is to say that God's subjective aim is at intensity of experience. In a later passage, Whitehead explains why God aims at intensity of experience:

The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute God's purpose are seeking intensity, and not preservation....In the foundations of his being, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. He cares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concerns derivation from its ancestry. His aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step toward the fulfulment of his own being. (PR 105)

We may draw several conclusions from these two passages. First, God's own subjective aim is at intensity of experience in God’s own nature. This does not mean that God's aim is selfish but merely that God has goals, just as finite actual entities do. Second, God's subjective aim for each temporal actual entity is at intensity of feeling ("depth of satisfaction") in the experience of that actual entity. Third, God appropriates the experiences achieved by temporal actual entities as data to increase the intensity of feeling in God's own experience. In short, God is concerned with promoting both God’s welfare and the welfare of temporal actual entities.

II. It seems clear, then, that intensity of feeling is Whitehead's highest good in Process and Reality. However, it should be noted that intensity of feeling is merely a formal concept for Whitehead; it does not tell us what content the experience of an actual entity should have but merely what form it should have. Furthermore, intensity of feeling (or intensity of experience) can be explicated in terms of the concepts of "balance" and "complexity" (see PR 278-80). An intense experience is one which synthesizes many different elements into a harmonious whole instead of excluding some elements from synthesis because they are incompatible with other elements.

Let us look more closely at Whitehead's elucidation of his concepts of "balance" and "complexity." Whitehead defines "complexity" as "the realization of contrasts, and contrasts of contrasts, and so on" (PR 278). Here we must discover what Whitehead means by a contrast. As Donald Sherburne points out, the term "contrast" is somewhat misleading, since Whitehead uses the expression "to set in contrast with" to mean "to put in a unity with" rather that "to set over and against one another."(5) For Whitehead, a contrast is a synthesis of many elements into a unity. The opposite of contrast for him is not comparison but incompatibility (PR 145), and by incompatibility he means aesthetic incompatibility. Two entities can be set into contrast by a new actual entity only if they are aesthetically compatible to be elements in its experience.

It is possible for an actual entity to build upon the contrasts already present in its experience so that we obtain a contrast whose elements are previous contrasts (or syntheses); Whitehead calls these new contrasts "higher contrasts" (PR 145) or "contrasts of contrasts" (PR 278). The more contrasts and the higher the level of the contrasts which an actual entity can build into its experience, the greater complexity its experience will have.

Whitehead gives several explanations of the concept of "balance." Perhaps his most revealing one defines balance as "the adjustment of identities and diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of inhibition by incompatibilities" (PR 278). Balance is the limiting condition upon complexity. An experience is balanced when it allows for the maximum number of desirable contrasts without the elimination of still more desirable contrasts because these latter contrasts are incompatible with the contrasts which have already been realized. Another term for "balance" would be "harmony." Balance is achieved when there is sufficient harmony among the elements of an experience to permit the realization of the maximum number of desirable contrasts without the exclusion of still more desirable contrasts.

An intense experience, then, is an experience with balanced complexity. As Whitehead remarks, the achievement of intensity in experience is similar to the achievement of intensity in art: "An intense experience is an aesthetic fact, and its categoreal conditions are to be generalized from aesthetic laws in particular arts" (PR 279). We can see what Whitehead means here by looking at one reason for the universal appeal of certain works of art. Why do Shakespeare's King Lear and Beethoven's Fifth Symphony enjoy perennial appeal among those who appreciate art? The reasons for this appeal are complex, but one reason can be found in the scope, depth, and integrity of each work of art. In other words, they are great (at least in part) because they exhibit the characteristic of "balanced complexity;" they each synthesize a wide variety of materials into a harmonious whole.

III. Whitehead deals with the conditions which promote intensity of feeling in Process and Reality, Part II, Chapter IV, which is entitled "Organisms and Environment." He returns to this topic briefly in Part II, Chapter VII, "The Subjectivist Principle." In the first of these chapters, Whitehead classifies the satisfaction of an actual entity with reference to four parameters: triviality, vagueness, narrowness, and width (PR 111). He observes that these characteristics in the satisfaction have their origins in the characteristics of the data from which the new actual entity arises. He also speaks of this data as the environment of a new actual entity. Thus the degree of intensity which a new actual entity can achieve in its satisfaction is largely governed by the objective nature of the environment (i.e., actual world) from which it arises. Intensity of feeling is intensity of subjective experience, but the degree of intensity is primarily a function of the objective basis of that experience.

Now let us examine each of Whitehead’s four parameters for classifying the satisfaction of an actual entity. Triviality results from a lack of coordination of the various factors in the environment. Whitehead also seems to identify triviality with chaos (PR 110). In a trivial environment, the differences between the various elements it contains are accentuated rather than their similarities. Vagueness is the opposite of triviality. Vagueness is due to an excess of similarity among the elements that make up the environment. In a vague environment, the different elements within it are indiscriminately blended into a unity, while their differences are ignored.

Whitehead claims that the environment from which an actual entity arises needs both the right sort of triviality and the right sort of vagueness in order to produce harmony in its experience. Here Whitehead seems to use the term "harmony" much as he uses the term "intensity" elsewhere. He explains this claim in the following way:

The right chaos [i.e., triviality], and the right vagueness, are jointly required for any effective harmony. They produce the massive simplicity which has been expressed by the term 'narrowness.' Thus chaos is not to be identified with evil; for harmony requires the due coordination of chaos, vagueness, narrowness, and width. (PR 112, parenthetical comment added)

We now need to see what Whitehead means by the terms "narrowness" and "width." According to Whitehead, narrowness and width are two dimensions exhibited by the satisfaction of an actual entity (PR 166). Narrowness results from the intensification of certain common characteristics in the data (PR 112). The intensification of common characteristics in turn presupposes a background of vagueness. This is because vagueness in the environment emphasizes the similarities among its elements and glosses over their differences. Width results from the inclusion of a large number of contrasts of diverse elements in the satisfaction. It also involves the coordination of the intensities of the individual components which have been supplied through the operation of narrowness. Accordingly, width presupposes the diversities in the data which have been emphasized in the dimension of triviality. Whereas narrowness promotes intensity in the satisfaction, width promotes complexity and diversity. As Whitehead puts it, "The savoring of the complexity of the universe can enter into the satisfaction [of an actual entity] only through the dimension of width" (PR 166, parenthetical comment added).

When Whitehead discusses these four parameters, he speaks of them as conditions for the harmony of experience, not for the intensity of experience. He does talk in terms of intensity, but this is mainly in connection with narrowness (PR 112). Yet in a later and more definitive passage at the end of Part III, Whitehead spells out the conditions for intensity of feeling in the satisfaction of an actual entity, and here he clearly speaks in terms of intensity as the final aim of experience. Consider the conclusion of his discussion of the "second species" of physical purposes:

Thus an enduring object gains the enhanced intensity of feeling arising from contrast between inheritance and novel effect, and also gains the enhanced intensity arising from the combined inheritance of its stable rhythmic character throughout its life-history. It has the weight of repetition, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of the contrast....The subjective aim is seeking width with its contrasts, within the unity of a general design. An intense experience is an aesthetic fact, and its categoreal conditions are to be generalized from aesthetic laws in particular arts. (PR 279)

Whitehead continues to speak of contrasts and balance in this passage, but it is clear from the context that these factors are regarded as preconditions for the intensity of experience. Consequently, I think we can take Whitehead's earlier passages from Part II as giving an account of the conditions which must be present in the data in order to promote intensity of experience.

IV. We will now investigate what Whitehead takes to be the highest good in Adventures of Ideas. Here Whitehead places the question of what is intrinsically good within the wider context of what qualities characterize a civilized society. He presents us with a list of five such qualities—Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, and Peace (AI 274, 285). It is also clear that he considers each of these qualities to be valuable in itself. It seems quite likely that one of these qualities (or a combination of two or more of them) will turn out to be Whitehead’s highest good in Adventures of Ideas. Yet the qualities of Truth and Beauty stand out from the rest, since these are the qualities traditionally associated with Goodness. Also, Whitehead himself notes that the two values of Truth and Beauty have a certain ultimacy about them (AI 241). Thus, we shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the claims of Truth and Beauty to be Whitehead’s highest good. This is not to say that Art, Adventure, and Peace are unimportant for Whitehead, or that a complete discussion of Truth and Beauty must not involve a discussion of these other qualities. Yet this is a topic we cannot pursue here.

We must now examine Whitehead’s definitions of Beauty and Truth, since he is departing from the ordinary usage of these terms. For Whitehead, the primary sense of Beauty is not the beauty of the objects of experience, such as a beautiful rose or a beautiful painting. Instead, he claims that Beauty in its primary sense is to be found within an experience. As Whitehead puts it:

Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience [i.e., an actual entity]. Thus in its primary sense Beauty is a quality which find exemplification in actual occasions. (AI 250, parenthetical comment added)

When Whitehead says that Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience, I think that he means that Beauty is the harmonious adaptation of these factors. Indeed, Whitehead later characterizes Beauty as "the perfection of Harmony" (AI 250). Also, the term “adaptation” implies that experience has a teleological orientation; as Whitehead puts it, “‘Adaptation’ implies an end” (AI 250). Whitehead goes on to claim that there are two aims implied by the adaptation toward a goal which promotes beauty in an experience. The first aim is a negative one: this is the aim of avoiding conflict and inhibition among the various elements which are coming together to form the new occasion of experience. If conflicts and inhibitions are successfully avoided, then the "minor form" of beauty is achieved (AI 250). But Whitehead goes on to claim that there is a major form of beauty, a form which presupposes but goes beyond the minor form (AI 250). The major form of Beauty is a positive form which builds upon the compatibilities which have been achieved through the minor form. In the major form of Beauty, new contrasts are introduced into the experience of the actual entity through the synthesis of various elements in its objective data. These contrasts in turn raise the intensities of the components of the experience as well as coordinating the parts so as to produce a "massive feeling of the whole" (AI 250). This is clearly the higher form of Beauty, and it has a definite affinity with the "balanced complexity" which Whitehead discusses in Process and Reality. This type of beauty can only arise in the higher phases of experience, since it depends upon an actual entity’s capacity to introduce new contrasts into its experience instead of eliminating diverse elements as incompatibilities.

Whitehead later distinguishes two different meanings of the term "Beauty." He has already claimed that Beauty in its primary sense refers to the Beauty which is realized within the experience of actual entities. Now he recognizes a secondary sense of Beauty; this is the beauty which can be found in the data from which a new actual entity arises. Whitehead prefers to use the term “beautiful” in connection with the objective data from which a new actual entity originates (AI 255–6). He also claims that the objective data are beautiful if they have the capacity for eliciting the experience of Beauty in a fortunately constituted actual occasion. Yet at one point, Whitehead explains that the beauty achieved by any given actual entity depends on two factors: “both on the objective content from which that occasion originates and also on the spontaneity of the (actual) occasion” (AI 255). I think it is important to notice that beauty in subjective experience depends, at least in part, upon the presence of elements in that actual entity’s environment which are conducive to a rich aesthetic experience. Most people who are locked in a dark closet or a prison cell do not find themselves in the proper environment for having rich and rewarding experiences. This is not to say that it is impossible to realize beautiful experiences in such conditions; great literature has been composed by persons locked up in prisons (for example, Boethius). Yet Whitehead points out that such achievements are "fortunate" (AI 255) and hence surely not the rule. Instead, the subjective experience of beauty normally requires an objective environment which has appropriate capacities for promoting such an experience. Although beauty is experienced subjectively, the conditions which make such an experience possible are objective.

Whitehead’s discussion of Truth is also complex, since he defines Truth by using terms which themselves need to be defined. He puts it this way:

Truth is a qualification which applies to Appearance alone. Reality is just itself, and it is nonsense to ask whether it be true or false. Truth is the conformation of Appearance to Reality. (AI 241)

In order to understand this definition of Truth, we need to know what both Appearance and Reality are for Whitehead. This will take us on a brief digression into Whitehead's metaphysics.

Whitehead devotes Ch. 14 of Adventures of Ideas to a discussion of the difference between appearance and reality. He defines "reality" as the past actual world from which a new actual entity arises:

The objective content of the initial phase of reception is the real antecedent world, as given for that occasion (i.e., actual entity). This is the reality from which that creative advance starts . . . . There is nothing there apart from the real agency of the actual past, exercising its function of objective immortality. This is reality, at that moment, for that occasion. (AI 210; parenthetical comment added)

Appearance, by contrast, is the final result of the process in which a new actual entity transforms the initial data which it inherits from the past into its own novel experience. Appearance arises only in the higher phases of experience; it is only important for the high-grade actual entities to be found in living creatures. Whitehead mentions sense-perception as a prime example of appearance and notes the superficiality of sense-perception as a gateway to the ultimate metaphysical realities (AI 219). By contrast, the reality of the past actual world is demonstrated by the causal force it exerts upon all actual entities that lie in its future. It is clear that Whitehead considers reality to be much more important than appearance, though as human beings we must always begin to approach reality through the appearances with which we are most familiar (e.g., the data of sense-perception).

Now we can see what Whitehead means when he says that Truth is the conformation of Appearance to Reality. A truth-relation obtains between appearance and reality when appearance is such that it faithfully reflects the reality from which it has arisen. Although we would normally think that this truth-relation would hold only between propositions and reality, Whitehead also claims that there can be a truth-relation between sense-perception and reality. But the details of his view of this matter do not concern us here.

V. We are now in a position to answer the question of whether Whitehead considers Truth or Beauty to be the highest good. Whitehead directly addresses this question in Ch. 18 of Adventures of Ideas, which is entitled “Truth and Beauty.” He first observes that "Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion than Truth" (AI 265). This is because Beauty can concern the inter-relations of the various components of reality, the inter-relations of the various components of appearance, and the relationship between appearance and reality. By contrast, Truth merely concerns the relationship between appearance and reality. Thus, the scope of Beauty is wider than the scope of Truth. Any element in the universe can be beautiful, but only certain elements can enter into the truth-relationship. Next, Whitehead claims that there is an intrinsic difference between Beauty and Truth. He contends that Truth has no special value considered in and of itself. There is nothing inherent in Truth which will lead to the production of richness of experience. For this reason, Truth is not as valuable as Beauty:

. . . a truth-relation is not necessarily beautiful. It may even be neutral. It may be evil. Thus Beauty is left as the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying. (AI 266, italics added)

Now it might be objected that this argument is circular. It seems that Whitehead has already assumed that Beauty is the highest value. Otherwise, the claim that “a truth-relation is not necessarily beautiful" would not count against the view that Truth is the highest good. Yet I think that Whitehead can be rescued from this charge in the following way. When Whitehead says that a truth-relation is not necessarily beautiful, I think what he really means is that a truth-relation is not necessarily good. In other words, the fact that certain propositions are true is not necessarily good. For example, consider the proposition, “The blast that destroyed the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City April 19, 1995, killed 168 people and injured more than 500 people.” This proposition is true because it correctly describes what happened in Oklahoma City April 19, 1995. But the fact that this proposition is true does not imply that it describes an occurrence which is good. Indeed, it would be much better (both morally and aesthetically) if the proposition in question had been false. This is one way in which Whitehead’s argument here can be understood in a non-circular fashion. If we grant him this interpretation, then his argument leads to his conclusion that Beauty is a higher value than Truth.

Whitehead goes on to point out, however, that in general Truth is very important for the promotion of Beauty. There is a “blunt force” about Truth which leads directly to the realization of harmony in experience. But the type of Truth required for the fullest realization of Beauty is what Whitehead terms a "discovery" and not a "recapitulation":

The truth that for such extremity of Beauty is wanted is that truth-relation whereby Appearance summons up new resources of feeling from the depths of Reality. It is a Truth of feeling, and not a Truth of verbalization. The relata in Reality must lie below the stale presuppositions of verbal thought. The Truth of supreme Beauty lies beyond the dictionary meaning of words. (AI 266-7)

Whitehead also notes that Truth stabilizes Beauty and makes it more secure. When appearance does conform to reality, we can be more confident that the Beauty which is presently being realized in our experience will continue to be realized in the future.

There are some who claim that the values of both Truth and Beauty can be combined into one supreme value, “Truthful Beauty.” This is the view of David L. Hall, who claims that the aim of all experience is at Truthful Beauty—that is, Beauty which is grounded in Truth.(6) This proposal is attractive at first glance; Beauty which is supported by Truth would seem to be more valuable than Beauty which is not supported by Truth. However, Hall formulates his claim in a way that does not agree with what Whitehead actually says in Adventures of Ideas. Whenever he talks about Truthful Beauty, Whitehead identifies it as the aim of art, not as the aim of all experience (see AI 267-8). It would be unduly optimistic to claim, as Hall does, that the aim of art is identical with the aim of all experience.(7) For Whitehead, art is the “purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality” (AI 267, italics mine), and Whitehead’s concept of purpose implies the presence of an artist who has this purpose. But the aim of existence in general is Beauty simpliciter, whether or not it is buttressed by Truth.

The merit of Hall's proposal is that it calls our attention to the "general importance of Truth for the promotion of Beauty" (AI 266). Although Beauty is Whitehead's highest good in Adventures of Ideas, Truth is important because it stabilizes the Beauty achieved in experience and sustains the conditions necessary for the future achievement of Beauty. This is especially the case when the Truth in question is the conformation of the Appearance of the present to the Reality of the stubborn facts of the past. The enjoyment of Beauty is always a fine thing, but the enjoyment of Beauty is even more to be treasured when it is anchored on "the depths of Reality" (AI 267).

VI. Now let us examine Whitehead’s account of the conditions under which Beauty in experience arises. In Chapter 17 of Adventures of Ideas (“Beauty”), Whitehead distinguishes four factors which are crucial to the production of beauty in experience: strength, massiveness, intensity, and harmony. Also, a fifth factor is introduced later: the significance of the individual details in the data for experience. Whitehead's most important discussion of these factors comes in Sections VII and VIII of Chapter 17. Although his discussion here is not crystal clear, it seems that Whitehead wants to establish the following relationships among the factors which give rise to beauty in experience.

Let us first consider the individuality of the details presented by the objective data for a new actual entity. A datum which contains a diversity of significant individuals will promote more intensity in experience than a datum which does not. Yet the individual details must be synthesized into a harmonious whole through the introduction of contrasts. Otherwise, they will inhibit one another due to their incompatibilities. This is where the factor of massiveness enters in: massiveness obtains when the diversities of the individual details are coordinated and unified. Here massiveness resembles the factor which Whitehead calls "width" in Process and Reality.

Yet more than massiveness is needed for beauty in experience. There must also be an awareness of the significance of some of the individual factors in the datum. Such an awareness is needed to promote "strength of experience." As Whitehead expresses this point, "Enduring Individuality in the details is the backbone of strong experience" (AI 264). Here "strength of experience" resembles what he calls "narrowness" in Process and Reality.

Whitehead's final paragraphs in his chapter on Beauty focus on the two basic factors which lead directly to beauty in experience: harmony and intensity. Intensity results from the significance of the individual details in the datum ("strength of experience"), while harmony results from the coordination of the individual details in relation to a unified background (which is achieved through "massiveness"). Thus, Whitehead seems to be claiming that harmony and intensity are the final factors in experience that produce Beauty. The other factors he discusses are important mainly because they are the conditions behind the production of harmony and intensity.

Next Whitehead argues that neither intensity nor harmony by itself is sufficient to produce beauty in experience. His first point is that intense experience without the presence of harmony can be destructive and therefore evil. For example, an experience of pain can be very intense, but it can disrupt the harmony of the other components of our present experience. An intense pain can also inhibit future harmony: it can prevent us from synthesizing diverse elements in our future experience into a harmonious unity. Here Whitehead is implicitly rejecting the view of Process and Reality that intensity of experience by itself is the highest good.

Whitehead also argues that harmonious experience without intensity can be undesirable. As he puts it, “A mere qualitative Harmony within an experience comparatively barren of objects of high significance is a debased type of Harmony, tame, vague, deficient in outline and intention” (AI 264). He goes on to claim that a “beautiful system of objects” (AI 264) demands diversity of significant individuals as well as harmonious synthesis. Whitehead does not mention “intensity” directly in this passage, but we have already seen that intensity results from the significance of individual details in the data. Thus, intensity as well as harmony is needed for richness of experience.

Perhaps an example will clarify Whitehead's claim about the importance of intensity for the promotion of beauty. Consider the experience of hearing a barbershop quartet sing "Sweet Adeleine." This experience may be filled with harmony--after all, harmony is the trademark of barbershop quartets--but we would not want to rank it as one of the richest experiences of our lives. By contrast, consider the experience of hearing the New York Philharmonic Orchestra perform Mozart’s sixth symphony. Again, this experience would exhibit harmony, although there may be discords that emerge in the course of the performance which are woven into the final harmony. Yet the dimension which is most significantly enhanced is intensity. The orchestra is a more complex ensemble than the barbershop quartet; with the variety of string, wood, and brass instruments in the orchestra, the range of musical virtuosity increases. Of course, the material with which the orchestra is working lends itself to greater harmony and intensity than the material available to the barbershop quartet; Mozart's sixth symphony is a richer work of art than "Sweet Adeleine." This example nonetheless illustrates my point that harmony alone is insufficient for the production of beautiful experience.

My conclusion is that Whitehead has reconceptualized his theory of how experiential goodness is attained in Adventures of Ideas. In Process and Reality, Whitehead takes intensity of experience to be the highest good, and intensity of experience depends both upon balance (or harmony) and complexity. At this point, Whitehead views harmony as merely one condition for the production of the higher value of intensity of experience. Yet Whitehead gives these factors a different emphasis in Adventures of Ideas. Here he places harmony and intensity on the same level; both are required for the attainment of beauty in experience. Thus the value of “Beauty” is clearly different from the value of “intensity of experience,” although there is a similarity among the factors which lead to the realization of each value.

Here I should make it clear that "Beauty" is a very broad notion for Whitehead. The examples I have given of beautiful experience have been drawn from the realm of aesthetic beauty, but aesthetic beauty is just one species of beauty for Whitehead. In addition to aesthetic beauty, there is intellectual beauty, moral beauty, social beauty, religious beauty, and possibly other kinds. Let me comment briefly on moral beauty in order to counteract the view (prevalent in some quarters) that Whitehead is exclusively concerned with aesthetic beauty and pays no attention to moral responsibility. It is true that Whitehead criticizes the claims made throughout the history of civilization that some one moral code is the final and definitive guide for human action (see AI 291). But this does not mean that he dismisses moral codes as arbitrary and relative to each society. Indeed, after he has criticized the "dogmatic fallacy" inherent in the claim of absolute validity made for particular moral codes, he praises moral codes in general as embodying "the aim at a social perfection" (ibid., emphasis mine). He also cites the action of Regulus as a prime example of praiseworthy moral conduct:

Certainly Regulus did not return to Carthage, with the certainty of torture and death, cherishing any mystic notions of another lie--either a Christian Heaven or a Buddhist Nirvana. He was a practical man, and his ideal aim was the Roman Republic flourishing in this world. But this aim transcended his individual personality; for this aim he sacrificed every gratification bounded by such limits. For him there was something in the world which could not be expressed as sheer personal gratification--and yet in thus sacrificing himself, his personal existence rose to its full height. (AI 290)

Whitehead would clearly characterize the action of Regulus as "beauty of conduct," and yet it was an action in which Regulus sacrificed his own self-interest for the wider aim of the welfare of the Roman Republic. Of course, not all actions of moral beauty need be actions of self-sacrifice, but Whitehead does think that moral actions must transcend a selfish concern with "personal gratification." Lynne Belaief gives a compelling presentation and defense of this point in her Toward a Whiteheadian Ethics(8).

VIII. What Whitehead says about God in Adventures of Ideas provides parallel support to my claim that he has replaced "intensity of experience" with "Beauty" as his highest good. First, it seems that Whitehead claims that God's subjective aim is toward the production of Beauty. My main evidence for this claim comes from a passage in Ch. 18: "The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty" (AI 265). Now I will admit that this evidence is indirect. This passage does not even mention God; in fact, Whitehead rarely mentions God in Part IV of Adventures of Ideas. Indeed, his main discussion of a "divine" element in the universe does not come until Chapters 19 and 20. Yet when Whitehead does discuss God, whom he terms the "Eros" or the "Divine Eros" of the universe (see AI 277, 295-6), his account coincides nicely with his remark about the "teleology of the Universe" in the passage just quoted. Whitehead describes the "Divine Eros" as "the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season" (AI 277). He goes on to note that this view of God implies that "a process must be inherent in God's nature" (ibid.). This description coincides with what Whitehead says about God's primordial nature in Process and Reality. One function of God's primordial nature is to provide the subjective aim for each new actual entity as a "lure for feeling." In this way, God provides the "teleology of the universe"; God supplies the ideals toward which actual entities should strive in order to experience the greatest beauty.

Whitehead also has a concept at the end of Ch. 20 which corresponds to his concept of God's consequent nature in Process and Reality. He speaks of this aspect of God in Adventures of Ideas as "an Adventure in the Universe as One," "The Unity of Adventure," and "this Supreme Adventure." I will term this aspect of God "The Unity of Adventure." Whitehead says that the "Eros" dimension of God needs to be supplemented by "The Unity of Adventure" (AI 295). The Unity of Adventure prehends all the particular actual occasions as they reach their satisfactions and unifies them into one "Great Fact" (ibid.). God experiences the beauty in this "Great Fact" and then transmits this beauty to the next generation of actual occasions. Indeed, Whitehead speaks of the "final beauty" enjoyed both by God and finite actual entities as the justification of the creative advance of the universe:

In this Supreme Adventure, the Reality which the Adventure transmutes into its Unity of Appearance, requires the real occasions of the advancing world each claiming its due share of attention. This Appearance, thus enjoyed, is the final Beauty with which the Universe achieves its justification. (AI 295)

For Whitehead, the goal of the creative process is this "final Beauty" which satisfies the urge of the "Divine Eros" and the aspirations of the many finite actual entities. We must note that this beauty is not "final" in the sense that it brings a halt to the creative process. It is final only in the sense that it constitutes the proper culmination of the creative process at a given time. Whitehead makes it clear in Process and Reality that the interplay between God and the World is an ongoing affair of creative interaction (PR 346-51).

IX. Finally, I will argue that Whitehead's view of goodness in Adventures of Ideas is not only different from his Process and Reality view but also superior to it. This is because it is both more comprehensive and more dynamic than the Process and Reality view.

Whitehead’s view of goodness in Adventures of Ideas is more comprehensive because Beauty has a wider scope of application than intensity of experience. According to Adventures of Ideas, any factor in the universe can exhibit Beauty: the objective data from which a new actual entity arises, a subordinate phase within the experience of an actual entity, or the final satisfaction of the actual entity (see AI 265). By contrast, in Process and Reality, "intensity of experience" is a term which applies exclusively to the final satisfaction of an actual entity (except in the case of God). Thus, "intensity of experience" can only apply to the experience of subjects, whereas "Beauty" has a wider range of application. In particular, we can speak of the beauty of the objects that we experience, not just of the beauty that resides within our experience.

Furthermore, I would claim that the universe as a whole can exhibit Beauty, although this is not a point that Whitehead explicitly makes. Yet he does say things that are compatible with this view and sometimes even supportive of it. For example, Whitehead says:

Good and evil lie in depths and distances below and beyond appearance. They solely concern interrelations within the real world. The real world is good when it is beautiful. (AI 268, italics added)

By contrast, it would be difficult to claim that "intensity of experience" might somehow characterize the universe as a whole. This is because "intensity of experience" can only characterize individual actual entities. It cannot be a characteristic of nexus, societies, enduring objects, or anything else. This is because these entities lack subjective experience. But the universe as a whole is a nexus of actual entities, not a single actual entity. Therefore, the universe as a whole cannot enjoy "intensity of experience."

My second point is that Whitehead's theory of Beauty is more dynamic than his theory of intensity of experience. This point is closely related to the preceding one. Since Whitehead thinks of Beauty in comprehensive terms, he can grant that there are many forms of Beauty and that these forms are not necessarily compatible with one another (AI 266). Since this is the case, the process of the universe must involve transitions which lead us from one form of Beauty to another. He also admits that Discord, which can destroy the present form of Beauty, may be needed to lead us to new forms of Beauty (AI 266). Thus, Whitehead is aware of the tragic dilemma that it is sometimes necessary to destroy old forms of value in order to make room for fresh values to appear. He views the transition from old forms of value to new ones as a necessary feature of a universe in which process is fundamental.(9)

Here it might be objected that an emphasis on process also pervades the metaphysical doctrines of Process and Reality. Indeed, the very first category of explanation tells us: "That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the becoming of actual entities" (PR 22). Whitehead describes the universe as an "incompletion in the process of production" (PR 214-5), and he claims that all entities are caught up in the creative advance into novelty. But I would contend that Whitehead's emphasis upon process does not extend to his account of the value he calls "intensity of experience." Instead, "intensity of experience" is primarily a static concept; it applies to the satisfaction of an actual entity rather than to the process by which it comes into being. Although the process of concrescence aims at the satisfaction, the satisfaction terminates the process of concrescence as it sets the stage for the actual entity's "perishing." Thus the satisfaction stands between two processes and constitutes a process-less moment for enjoyment; as Whitehead puts it, "Time has stood still--if it only could" (PR 154).

By contrast with intensity, Beauty is a dynamic concept. First, Beauty pervades the whole process of concrescence in Adventures of Ideas. In order for beauty to be attained in the final satisfaction, there must be beauty in the objective data from which the new actual entity arises. Then the new actual entity must appropriate the beautiful elements from its objective data, synthesize them in accordance with its own subjective aim, and add its final creative stamp to the unity of experience which it attains. Second, the achievement of Beauty in larger units of organization (such as a whole social order) depends upon an appreciation of the dynamics that govern all processes of attainment. Whitehead is fond of using the example of ancient Greek civilization to illustrate this point (see AI 257-9). A certain civilization may aim at and attain a certain type of perfection (i.e., Beauty), just as ancient Greek civilization did. The ideals which made this perfection possible may be passed down from one generation to another. Yet there is a limit to the time-span during which these ideals can serve as effective lures for action. After a time, freshness disappears and boredom sets in. Whitehead claims that Discord must be introduced at this point to transform the civilization and maybe even destroy it. Yet this Discord may pave the way for the transition to still another form of Beauty in civilization (e.g., Medieval Christianity).

This brings me to my final point about the dynamism inherent in Whithead's concept of Beauty. Whitehead makes it clear that he thinks that process is unending, both on the microscopic (i.e., actual entity) level and on the macroscopic (e.g., civilization) level. But it follows from this that no form of Beauty can be attained and then simply maintained. Whitehead best expresses this point when he talks about "perfection":

Progress is founded upon the experience of discordant feelings. The social value of liberty lies in its production of discords. There are perfections beyond perfections. All realization is finite, and there is no perfection which is the infinitude of all perfections. (AI 257)

Here Whitehead is claiming that the process which lies at the heart of the universe involves an alternation between Beauty and Discord. All actual entities aim at some form of Beauty, and most socially ordered groups of actual entities (persons, social groups, civilizations) try to sustain and preserve the forms of Beauty which they find valuable. But Whitehead holds that no form of Beauty can be preserved forever; hence Discord is needed to point the way toward new forms of Beauty which can elicit new freshness and zest. In a sense, this is a tragic view of reality; all those things we deem most valuable are doomed to perish in the ongoing rush of process. But there is also an optimistic side; the Divine Eros is constantly beckoning the world toward new adventures, towards new ideals of Beauty which have not yet been actualized. And the tragedy of existence is at least mitigated by Whitehead's insistence that The Unity of Adventure will preserve the accomplishments of all finite actual entities forevermore.

ENDNOTES

1. Lewis S. Ford, The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics: 1925-1929, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.

2. Nobo, Jorge Luis, Whitehead's Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

3. Donald W. Sherburne, "The Process Perspective as Context for Educational Evaluation," Process Studies 20.2 (Summer, 1991), p. 84.

4. Previous treatments of Whitehead's theory of value include John Goheen, "Whitehead's Theory of Value," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 2nd ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 435-61; Donald W. Sherburne, A Whiteheadian Aesthetic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Jude D. Weisenbeck, Alfred North Whitehead's Philosophy of Values (Waukesha, Wisconsin: Thomas Press, 1969); David L. Hall, The Civilization of Experience: A Whiteheadian Theory of Culture (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1973); Lynne Belaief, Toward a Whiteheadian Ethics (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984); Frederick Ferre, "Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or Paradigm?" Philosophy 36 (Supp), 1994, pp. 59-73.

5. See Donald W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 216.

6. See David L. Hall, The Civilization of Experience: A Whiteheadian Theory of Culture (New York: Fordham, 1973), pp. 81-2.

7. Ibid.

8. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984.

9. Compare Lynne Belaief's discussion of the value of adventure in her Toward a Whiteheadian Ethics (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 133-35.

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